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Mastering Talent and Succession: The Art of Balancing Incentives in Tournament-Based Firms
In tournament-based organizations, managerial discretion in hiring significantly impacts performance and stability. Managers may sabotage by hiring lower-ability candidates to avoid future competition, a practice known as “selection sabotage.” Researchers Peiran Xiao and Hashim Zaman propose a “head start” mechanism to counteract this by giving managers an advantage in the tournament, encouraging them to hire […]
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