{"id":1759,"date":"2015-12-06T12:51:14","date_gmt":"2015-12-06T17:51:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/digital.hbs.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/the-islamic-state\/"},"modified":"2015-12-11T15:46:14","modified_gmt":"2015-12-11T20:46:14","slug":"the-islamic-state","status":"publish","type":"hck-submission","link":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/the-islamic-state\/","title":{"rendered":"The Islamic State"},"content":{"rendered":"

Executive Summary<\/u><\/p>\n

On June 29, 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (\u201cISIS\u201d) declared the revival of the Caliphate, and renamed itself the Islamic State (\u201cIS\u201d). Led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the Islamic State\u2019s stated objective, or \u201cbusiness model\u201d, is the re-establishment of a Sunni caliphate, an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. Despite its numerous perversions of the Islamic faith, IS asserts religious authority to justify its legitimacy and argues that its actions are in the interest of reviving Islam, uniting the Muslim world under truly Islamic rule, and fulfilling the orders of God.<\/p>\n

In order to support this objective, IS executes on a well designed and organized operating model, which includes four primary components: military, administrative, financial, media [1]. These areas of operations are highly integrated and function in a coordinated fashion in the advancement of the declared Caliphate.<\/p>\n

In light of its territorial gains, sustained operations within Iraq and Syria, and ongoing recruitment of international supporters, it is clear that the Islamic State has been very effective at aligning its operating and business models.<\/p>\n

Military Operations<\/u><\/p>\n

The military activity of IS is the most widely covered aspect of its operating model. Historically, IS\u2019s military strategy focused on conquering physical territory in Iraq and Syria, diverging from predecessor groups who centered their efforts on civilian based attacks in Western countries.<\/p>\n

IS leverages an enthusiastic and determined network of fighters who have a reputation for violence [2]. While the CIA estimated the number of IS fighters to be between 20,000 and 31,500 in late 2014, assessments are extraordinarily wide-ranging, with some reaching as high as 200,000 [3].<\/p>\n

IS has enjoyed significant military success and currently commands a region roughly the size of Belgium [4]. In al-Naba, its \u201cannual report\u201d, IS details the results of its military campaign and provides key \u201csuccess metrics\u201d organized by attack type (e.g. assassination, armed attack, cities taken over) and operating area (e.g. Baghdad, Anbar, Kirkuk). These reports demonstrate IS\u2019s effective use of distributed resources, sophisticated knowledge of military strategy, and coherent leadership structure.<\/p>\n

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ISIS Activity, Source [5]: Brookings<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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Recent attacks in Egypt and France exhibit a potential shift in IS military strategy. While some argue that these attacks reveal an increasing desperation of IS leadership, they also display a desire and capability to carry out sophisticated mass-casualty attacks globally [6].<\/p>\n

Administrative Operations<\/u><\/p>\n

The Islamic State is divided into 18 Wilayats (provinces), each with a Wali (governor) who oversees the local organization and civilian administration. After taking control of a newly acquired territory, IS assumes governance responsibilities, establishing sharia police forces and courts. It also oversees religious education, aid distribution, and services such as water, electricity, and sanitation.<\/p>\n

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ISIS militants parade in Tel Abyad, Syria, on the border with Turkey in 2014, Source [5]: Brookings<\/figcaption><\/figure>Proclaiming to offer an alternative to endemic corruption of past governments, IS frequently receives support from local civilians initially. However, IS\u2019s intrusion in civilians\u2019 daily lives, enforcement of rules about appearance and behavior, and savagery of punishment quickly results in popular acquiescence through fear [7]. This dynamic may ultimately prove to be IS\u2019s undoing, as its ruthless tactics and totalitarianism have led to disaffection and exodus of civilian populations.<\/p>\n

Financial Operations<\/u><\/p>\n

The Islamic State controls significant financial resources. In 2014, external parties estimated that IS generated ~$50 million in monthly income and held between $1.5-2.0 billion in net assets [8].<\/p>\n

Oil production from IS controlled facilities is its largest source of income. IS is estimated to produce between 30,000-80,000 barrels per day; even if sold at a price of $25 per barrel, this would generate daily income between $2-4 million [9]. Additional sources of income include: bank and civilian asset seizures, business extortion, highway checkpoint \u201ctolls\u201d, and prisoner ransom payments. Importantly, IS appears to have sufficiently diverse sources of revenue to survive the loss of any one in particular, including oil production.<\/p>\n

IS\u2019s financial operations have proven invaluable in supporting its strategic \u201cbusiness\u201d goals. With this income, IS maintains civilian infrastructure, purchases weapons, and provides salaries to fighters. These wages serve as an important recruitment tool to attract supporters; with salaries of nearly $350 per month, fighters earn nearly five times as much as ordinary Syrian civilians [10].<\/p>\n

Media Operations<\/u><\/p>\n

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Page 2 of the 2013 al-Naba report, which summarizes military achievements, Source [12]: Bloomberg<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

IS leverages extensive media efforts to garner support, promote its images, and raise money.<\/p>\n

IS has been prolific in content production and dissemination as a result of its decentralized media structure. In the last two years, media efforts have been expanded beyond its original media outlet, al-Furqan Media, to include other outlets such as al-I\u2019tisam Media, Ajnad Media, and al-Hayat Media, as well as provincial-level media offices [11].<\/p>\n

The media operation of IS produces a range of propaganda material, including al-Naba, its annual report, and Dabiq, a digital magazine published in English and European languages. Both are expressions of IS\u2019s sophisticated approach to articulating its caliphate vision.<\/p>\n

IS has also demonstrated an advanced prowess in its use of social media, and in effect, actively crowd sources its propaganda. IS and its supporters have an active presence on outlets such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook. The decentralized distribution systems of these platforms have maximized its outreach and allowed its message to spread directly to its intended audience.<\/p>\n

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Tweets per day: ISIS, Islamic State and \u062f\u0627\u0639\u0634, Source [13]: Topsy.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1] Barrett, Richard. \u201cThe Islamic State.\u201d The Soufan Group (2014): 23. Web. 5 December 2015. http:\/\/soufangroup.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/10\/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[2] Barrett, Richard. \u201cThe Islamic State.\u201d The Soufan Group (2014): 35. Web. 5 December 2015. http:\/\/soufangroup.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/10\/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[3] Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed (2015, Feb, 9). How Many Fighters Does The Islamic State Really Have? War on the Rocks. Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2015\/02\/how-many-fighters-does-the-islamic-state-really-have\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[4] Ezrow, Natasha (2015, Nov, 16). Explainer: Why Islamic State is proving so hard to defeat. The Conversation. Retrieved December 5, 2015, from https:\/\/theconversation.com\/explainer-why-islamic-state-is-proving-so-hard-to-defeat-50790<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[5] McCants, William (2015, Sept, 1). The Believer. Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/research\/essays\/2015\/thebeliever<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[6] Williams, Jennifer R. (2015, Dec, 2). We were wrong about ISIS. Brookings. Retrieved December 5, 2015, from http:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/blogs\/markaz\/posts\/2015\/12\/02-we-were-wrong-about-isis-williams<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[7] Barrett, Richard. \u201cThe Islamic State.\u201d The Soufan Group (2014): 41. Web. 5 December 2015. http:\/\/soufangroup.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/10\/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[8] Stupples, David (2015, Dec, 3). To defeat Islamic State we must sever its oil lifeline \u2013 here\u2019s how. The Conversation. Retrieved December 5, 2015, from https:\/\/theconversation.com\/to-defeat-islamic-state-we-must-sever-its-oil-lifeline-heres-how-51751<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[9] Barrett, Richard. \u201cThe Islamic State.\u201d The Soufan Group (2014): 47. Web. 5 December 2015. http:\/\/soufangroup.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/10\/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[10] Laub, Zachary and Jonathan Masters (2015, Nov, 16). CFR Backgrounders: The Islamic State. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved December 5, 2015 from http:\/\/www.cfr.org\/iraq\/islamic-state\/p14811<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[11] Zelin, Aaron D. \u201cPicture Or It Didn\u2019t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State\u2019s Official Media Output.\u201d Perspectives on Terrorism Volume 9, Number 4 (2015). Web. 5 Dec 2015.\u00a0 http:\/\/www.terrorismanalysts.com\/pt\/index.php\/pot\/article\/view\/445\/html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[12] Hoffman, Allison (2014, Jun, 18). 1,083 Assassinations and Other Performance Metrics: ISIS\u2019s Year in Review. Bloomberg. Retrieved December 5, 2015 from http:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/bw\/articles\/2014-06-18\/1-083-assassinations-and-other-isis-performance-metrics-an-insurgencys-year-in-review<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[13] Tweets per Day: ISIS, Islamic State, and \u062f\u0627\u0639\u0634(November 6th<\/sup> \u2013 December 6th<\/sup>). Digital image. Topsy. 6 Dec. 2015. Web. http:\/\/topsy.com\/analytics?q1=ISIS&q2=Islamic%20State&q3=%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4&via=Topsy<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Disciplined, Well-Organized & Violent Push for the Revival of the Caliphate<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":504,"featured_media":1760,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","categories":[],"class_list":["post-1759","hck-submission","type-hck-submission","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"connected_submission_link":"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/assignment\/the-tom-challenge-tom-winners-and-losers-assignment\/","yoast_head":"\nThe Islamic State - Technology and Operations Management<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/the-islamic-state\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Islamic State - Technology and Operations Management\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The Disciplined, Well-Organized & Violent Push for the Revival of the Caliphate\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/the-islamic-state\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Technology and Operations Management\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-12-11T20:46:14+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2015\/12\/IS-Group-Picture.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1040\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"600\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"6 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/the-islamic-state\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/d3.harvard.edu\/platform-rctom\/submission\/the-islamic-state\/\",\"name\":\"The Islamic State - 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